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NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
VOLUME I 1983
INSTITUTIONS SPECIALIZED TO THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES*
LUNG-CHU CHEN**
It is an honor and a pleasure to be with you here at the
First World Congress on Human Rights. I am particularly glad
to be here in Costa Rica, the oldest democracy in Latin America,
because of the immense contributions your country has made in
the field of international protection of human rights. My admi-
ration goes especially to your leading and persevering efforts in
proposing the creation of a United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, an equivalent of a global ombudsman. I hope
that some day these unceasing efforts will come to fruition for
the common interest of all humankind.
I have been asked to speak to you about "Institutions Spe-
cialized to the Protection of Human Rights in the United
States." As a federal union, the United States does not have an
institution known as "ombudsman" at the federal level, though
some form of ombudsman has found growing expression and in-
terest in some local communities. The functions traditionally as-
sociated with the institution of ombudsman in various countries'
*This is an expanded version of a speech delivered on December 8, 1982 at the First
World Congress on Human Rights, held in Alajuela, Costa Rica, under the auspices of
the Costa Rican government. The author wishes to thank Bill Gottlieb and Maurine
Grossman for research assistance and the Annual staff for adding the footnotes.
**Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1. A major theme of the First World Congress on Human Rights was the institution
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are, however, discharged by some equivalent institutional prac-
tices and arrangements in the United States. In order to com-
prehend the total picture of the protection of human rights in
the United States, it is important to relate to the operation of
the entire Constitutional system, taking into account the varying
functions performed by both governmental and nongovernmen-
tal participants.
In many ways, the Constitution of the United States is
unique within the family of nations. It is the oldest written con-
stitution; it is a living document, given new meaning and vitality
under ever-changing conditions through Supreme Court deci-
sions and formal amendments; and it extends its protections to
all citizens, humble as well as prominent.
The text of the Constitution of the United States consists of
only seven articles, as originally adopted in 1789, and 26 amend-
ments to the Constitution. Together they contain about 7000
words. But our Constitution is not just the text of these provi-
sions printed in black letters on white paper. Our Constitution is
a living constitution; it is a dynamic and continuing process of
communication, practice, and decision, beginning even before
1789 and coming down to date, which establishes and maintains
the basic features of authoritative decision in the body politic. It
is made and continually remade in response to the changing de-
mands and expectations of the people under ever-changing con-
ditions. It reflects not only the shared expectations of the origi-
nal framers of the Constitution, but also those of succeeding
generations, as reflected in the practice and application of the
Constitution. Above all, it also reflects the contemporary shared
expectations and experience of community members today. It is
the totality of this ongoing, cumulative process of communica-
tion, experience, and decision, rather than any single compo-
nent, which establishes authoritative decision makers, projects
basic community policies, maintains necessary structures of au-
thority, allocates competences and effective power both verti-
of ombudsman in comparative perspective. See generally INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF
THE OMBUDSMAN (G. Caiden ed. 1983). This comprehensive, useful book consists of two
volumes, with selected bibliography. See also W. GELLHORN, OMBUDSMAN AND OTHERS:
CITIZENS' PROTECTORS IN NINE CoUNrRIEs (1966); ESTABLISHING OMBUDSMAN OFFICES: RE.-
CENT EXPERIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES (S. Anderson & J. Moore eds. 1972); THE
OMBUDSMAN: CITIZEN'S DEFENDER (D. Rowat ed. 1965).
[Vol. 1
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
cally in terms of federal-state relations and horizontally in terms
of the checks and balances among the three different branches
of the federal government, authorizes procedures for making dif-
ferent types of decisions, and thereby generates a continuing
flow of prescriptions and applications affecting the quality of life
in the shaping and sharing of all values.2
Central to this ongoing constitutive process is the overriding
concern for, and commitment to, the protection and fulfillment
of the human rights of individual persons, as guaranteed by
what is known as the Bill of Rights, a vital part of our Constitu-
tion. Our Bill of Rights sometimes is understood as having refer-
ence to only the first eight or ten amendments to the Constitu-
tion. But this is a rather restrictive view. From a comprehensive
perspective, the Bill of Rights encompasses not only the first
eight or ten amendments to the Constitution, but also all other
provisions having to do with the protection of the freedoms and
rights of the individual, whether contained in the original arti-
cles or other subsequent amendments. The guarantees provided
are not static, but dynamic. Like the constitutive process itself,
the Bill of Rights represents an ongoing process of communica-
tion, practice, and decision from the long past to the present.'
In a dynamic sense, our Bill of Rights in action manifests
the following features:
First, in terms of prescription,4 the Bill of Rights seeks to
protect the most intensely demanded values of human dignity.
The fundamental freedoms and rights of the individual are so
intensely demanded and highly cherished that they are given
special protection by formal constitutional prescriptions.
Second, in terms of invocation,5 special provision is made to
enable individuals who allege that their human rights have been
violated to challenge putative deprivations and to secure reme-
2. M. McDOUGAL, THE APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIVE PRESCRIPTIONS: AN ADDENDUM
TO JUSTICE CARDOZO 9-51 (1979). Cf. H. McBAIN, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (1927); Clark
& Trubek, The Creative Role of Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Common Law
Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255 (1961); Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934); Miller, Notes on the Concept of the "Living" Constitution, 31
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 881 (1963); J. GREY, THE NATURE AND SOURCE OF LAW (2d ed. 1931).
3. For a generalization of the distinctive features of a bill of rights, see M. McDou-
GAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 314-20 (1980).
4. See id. at 87, 261-77, 820-32, 406.
5. See id. at 88, 278-89, 357-60, 406-07.
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dies before authoritative decision makers. Provision is made for
specialized invocation by representatives of the community, such
as the Attorney General.
Third, in terms of application,6 provision is made for the
applicability of intensely demanded individual rights prescrip-
tions to all decision makers and community members, whether
official or nonofficial. Officials at all levels of government, from
federal to state to local, are required to observe and promote
these rights. Prescriptions designed to protect human rights are
buttressed by specialized institutions for application. Allocations
of competence are balanced in such a way as to secure indepen-
dent judicial review of decisions and activities of officials and
others who are alleged to have imposed deprivations of human
rights.
And, finally, in terms of termination,7 such intensely de-
manded prescriptions can be changed only with extraordinary
difficulty or in the same way in which they were created. Special
difficulties are placed in the way of amending or terminating in-
tensely demanded prescriptions about human rights. It is com-
monly the case that such prescriptions can be changed only in
the ways that they are created.
I shall elaborate further point by point.'
I turn first, to prescription, that is, the projection of author-
itative community policies. The fundamental freedoms and
rights of the individual are protected by constitutional prescrip-
tions which are well-developed and intensely valued. In the orig-
inal document of the U.S. Constitution, few references were
made to the rights of the individual: structures and relationships
within government were the primary concern.' The Framers be-
lieved that stronger government was necessary, but that the gov-
ernment must not become too powerful. Our Constitution re-
flects their effort to accommodate these needs and risks. Greater
6. See id. at 88, 289-99, 332-57, 407.
7. See id. at 88, 299-307, 360-63, 407-08.
8. For further elaboration of distinctive decision functions, see H. LASSWELL, THE
DECISION PROCESS: SEVEN CATEGORIES OF FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS (1956); McDougal, Lass-
well & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, in 1 THE
FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 73, 131-54 (R. Falk & C. Black eds. 1969),
reprinted in M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 191, 267-86 (1981).
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton).
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powers were granted to the central, federal, government to cure
some of the weaknesses of the earlier confederation, yet the
Constitution also assured restraints on governmental power. To
the drafters, protection against excessive concentrations of
power lay primarily in diffusions of power among a variety of
governmental units. Thus, the Constitution allocated powers
among the nation and several states, particularly by specifying
those powers which the federal government might exercise.10
Moreover, the less-than-total powers given to the federal govern-
ment were diffused among three separate governmental
branches: the legislative, the executive, and the judicial.
Our Constitution was adopted in 1789. Originally, it con-
tained only a small number of provisions bearing directly on the
rights of the individual, notably: no suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus by Congress, except in cases of re-
bellion or invasion threatening public security;11 forbidding both
Congress and states to pass any bill of attainder," any ex post
facto's law; and banning states from adopting any law impairing
the obligation of contracts."'
At the convention which drafted the Constitution for sub-
mission to the original thirteen states for ratification, there was
widespread demand for additional constitutional protection of
individual-as well as state-rights. Initially, a controversy
arose over the way to ensure the widest protection of basic rights
and liberties. Fear was expressed that enumeration of individual
liberties would effect a limitation of rights to those set down in
print. Rights not specified, it was argued, might be denied. The
contrary position, upheld by Thomas Jefferson, ultimately pre-
vailed, although the victory did not come until after the end of
the Constitutional Convention. In adopting the new Constitu-
tion, some states demanded, as a condition of ratification, that
the document be amended immediately to include what are now
the first ten amendments-the Bill of Rights. These were pro-
posed as constitutional amendments at the first session of Con-
gress and were ratified in 1791.
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2-4; art. I1, § 2; art. III, § 1; art. IV; amend. 16.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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Of importance today are the first,15 fourth," fifth,17 sixth,18
eighth, 9 ninth,20 and tenth2 1 amendments to the Constitution.
The first amendment enunciates the guarantees of freedom
of religion, speech, and press and the right of the people to as-
semble peaceably and to petition the government. First amend-
ment guarantees are fiercely demanded and protected in the
United States and it is these values with which we are so often
associated by peoples of the world, especially by those who
yearn for freedom.
The fourth amendment bans unreasonable searches and
seizures, safeguarding the individual's home, person, and prop-
erty. The fifth and sixth amendments provide far-reaching pro-
tections of basic rights for the accused person in criminal cases.
Protections include the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation, the right to a speedy public trial by
jury, and the right to be represented by counsel and to confront
witnesses. Under the fifth amendment, the accused may not be
compelled to testify against himself. The fifth amendment also
includes the prescription that life, liberty, and property shall not
be taken away without due process of law. Once again, in the
United States, these guarantees are highly valued, as they stem
from our belief that punishment must be accompanied by fair-
ness in procedure, including adequate notice, an opportunity to
be heard and to defend through public, impartial judicial pro-
ceedings. The eighth amendment prohibits excessive bail and
cruel and unusual punishment. The ninth addresses the fears
expressed during the ratification debates that an enumeration of
rights in the Constitution might somehow be misconstrued as a
form of limitation. It provides that the people shall retain other
rights not specifically mentioned in the Constitution. And, as a
final check on the undelegated powers of the federal govern-
ment, the tenth amendment reserves to the states and to the
people all powers not enumerated in the federal Constitution.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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This original Bill of Rights, as well as our entire Constitu-
tion, is not a static document, but has served as the "vehicle of
life of a nation. '12 In one sense, it reflects the very minimum
desires and protections expected by those who would invoke its
mandates. But in the larger sense, since its inception, it has
shaped the politics and policies of our nation, and its meaning is
to be found in our experiences.
The Constitution, as a government charter, provides an out-
line of organization, a projection of our nation's basic beliefs.
Many of its provisions are formulated at a high level of general-
ity; hence, the necessity for the document's interpretation and
reinterpretation.
Since the ratification of the Constitution in 1789, the
United States has moved from a rural society, through an era of
industrial growth, and into the space age. During that period of
200 years, our Constitution has shown itself to be sufficiently
flexible to meet changing demands and expectations of the peo-
ple, and the original document has undergone relatively few
changes. Where intensely demanded values and policies have
needed articulation or clarification, the Constitution has been
amended to reflect these values.
While all of these amendments have had an important ef-
fect on the fabric of our government and society, a few have had
a very substantial impact on human rights in our country. Most
notable are the thirteenth, 3 fourteenth," fifteenth, 5 nine-
teenth,"6 and twenty-fourth 7 amendments. The thirteenth
amendment, adopted in 1865, immediately after our Civil War,
abolished slavery. Under the fourteenth amendment, adopted
three years later, the states were enjoined to provide all persons
due process and equal protection of the laws. The amendment
forbids the states from infringing upon citizens' privileges and
immunities.2 " The fifteenth amendment guarantees the right to
22. Presidential Address of Woodrow Wilson, American Political Science Associa-
tion, 5 AMER. POL. Sci. REV. 1, 10 (Feb. 1911), quoted in 1 C. MAINES, THE ROLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLrrIcs, 1789-1835 44 (1944).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Relative to other portions of the fourteenth amend-
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vote against denial or abridgement on the basis of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude. The Constitution was not
amended again until 1920 when women secured the right to vote
through adoption of the nineteenth amendment. In 1964, our
right to vote was guaranteed further by the abolition of poll
taxes, 9 and recently, in 1971, the right to vote was further ex-
panded when the voting age was reduced from 21 to 18.30
Without question, the single most important prescriptive
change in our constitutional history has been the fourteenth
amendment. Its breadth and scope, and the meaning of its pro-
visions, probably comprise the most important aspect of consti-
tutional law in our country today. Its impact on human rights
has been enormous, particularly because it is the major vehicle
for the enforcement of our constitutional prescriptions at the
state and local level. I shall return to this when I talk about
application5 1
Turning to invocation, the central question is when human
rights deprivations occur, can victims or others bring complaints
to appropriate decision-makers for remedy. As Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes noted long ago, a right without a remedy will
not be a real right.32
In the United States, individual victims of human rights
deprivations are, as a matter of practice, afforded standing to
bring lawsuits and often they are assisted by non-governmental
organizations dedicated to human rights. In addition, special
provision has been made to authorize certain governmental
agencies to pursue human rights litigation in the public interest.
The grant of such authority to organs of the federal government
generally derives from an act of Congress or an Executive order.
It may be noted in passing that a comparable system of invoking
ment, the privileges and immunities clause has been interpreted infrequently by the
United States Supreme Court. It has been suggested that it is the "least significant of
the protections in § 1 of the 14th Amendment." G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 374 n.1 (10th ed. 1980). See, e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518
(1978); Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978); Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). See also Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55 at 71 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
31. See text accompanying notes 62-87, infra.
32. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 169 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
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public lawsuits operates within the states and local communities.
In terms of governmental institutions, the Department of
Justice ranks first. The Department of Justice, headed by the
Attorney General, is the primary federal department having re-
sponsibility for legal affairs.3 The Department represents the
government in legal matters, conducts, through the Solicitor
General, all Supreme Court suits in which the United States is
involved and provides legal advice to Executive agencies and to
the President. A principal strategy of the Department is litiga-
tion, the bringing of complaints before appropriate courts, or
participating in others' lawsuits, to secure compliance with the
law in the protection of human rights.
Within the Department, the Civil Rights Division primarily
is responsible for securing compliance with civil rights laws. The
Civil Rights Division is one of the Department's six litigating
divisions-along with the Civil, Criminal, Anti-trust, Tax, and
Lands and Natural Resources Divisions. It is the principal
agency of the federal government in enforcing civil rights laws in
the courts. The Civil Rights Division, established in 1957, is re-
sponsible for the enforcement of Federal civil rights laws
"prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, national origin,
religion, and in some cases sex, age or handicap in the areas of
voting, education, employment, housing, credit, the use of public
facilities and accommodations and in the administration of fed-
erally assisted programs." '
With the steady expansion of the Attorney General's au-
thority to enforce civil rights laws in new areas, the Civil Rights
Division is charged with the responsibility of securing compli-
ance with the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, 1964, and 1968;
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended in 1970, 1975, 1978,
and 1982; the Equal Credit Opportunity Act; and provisions
concerning civil rights contained in numerous other statutes.3 5
These statutes were enacted by Congress to fortify the equal
33. It is the function of the Attorney General to advise the President on questions of
law. 28 U.S.C. § 511 (1976). He is also to counsel the heads of executive and military
departments. 28 U.S.C. §§ 512-514 (1976). In litigation in which the United States, its
agent or office- is a party, litigation is conducted by the Department of Justice, except as
otherwise authorized by law. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1976).
34. United States Government Manual 1981/82 at 340.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 509 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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protection of the laws mandated by the fourteenth amendment
of the Constitution.
The famous Civil Rights Act of 19646 outlaws racial dis-
crimination in public accommodations and employment and
strengthens federal power to enforce school desegregation. The
Voting Rights Act of 1965'7 was designed to eliminate discrimi-
natory practices including physical harrassment and intimida-
tion, literacy tests, poll taxes, English-only elections, and gerry-
mandering by dominant racial groups. The Act creates
permanent protections for minority voting rights nationwide and
special protections designed to eliminate voting rights violations
in areas where abuse was notorious. Special protection was
achieved through the preclearance requirement: political dis-
tricts showing a pattern of severe voting discrimination prior to
November 1964 are required to obtain prior authorization or ap-
proval by either the Attorney General or the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia for changes in voting
procedures or practices. Without such preclearance, changes are
not permissible and cannot be legally enforced. The Fair Hous-
ing Act of 1968 abolishes discrimination in residential housing."8
Division efforts in the 1960's focused on cases of overt racial
discrimination and coercion against blacks in different value sec-
tors. The Division fought in the courts to end employment prac-
tices that barred the hiring and promotion of blacks. Litigation
was waged to eradicate segregation in public transportation, mo-
tels, restaurants, parks, and other public facilities. In the area of
education, the Division sought to cope with the problems of stu-
dents and faculty in officially segregated black and white
schools. Where civil rights workers and others asserting their
federal rights had faced violent opposition, the Division acted to
file criminal charges.
In this early period, viewed as a whole, issues addressed in
the field of civil rights were rather sharply drawn and the reme-
dies required were easy to fashion. Important civil rights con-
cepts owe their origin to this formative period.39
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb-1 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
39. Days, Earning Respect, in 7 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT COLLEGES
AND UNIVERSITIES, PRIVATE HIGHER EDUCATION: THE JOB AHEAD 3-7 (1979). See also L.
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In contrast, contemporary forms of discrimination are likely
to be covert, defying easy detection, and presenting difficult
problems of proof in court. For example, in the area of employ-
ment, Division litigators handle cases involving the complex is-
sues of affirmative action in hiring and promotion and employee
testing practices. In the area of fair housing, challenges are di-
rected toward a variety ofediscriminatory activities. The Division
challenges the refusal of mortgage lenders to make loans to per-
sons residing in predominantly black or low-income neighbor-
hoods-a practice called "redlining." Action is taken against
realtors who engage in the discriminatory practices of racial
steering and block busting. Lenders who pursue sex-biased
credit policies (requiring as a condition of a loan, for example,
that a woman sign a pledge not to become pregnant during the
period of the loan, if her income is to be used for repayment),
are the object of Division litigation efforts.40
Intent to discriminate is seldom apparent in this new gener-
ation of civil rights cases. Intent must frequently be ascertained
by reference to all the relevant factors in a given context, espe-
cially: disproportionate impact of the action, absence of permis-
sible purpose, and radical deviation from the normal pattern of
behavior and activities.'
Action against discrimination today is not restricted to pro-
tection of the rights of black citizens. Other groups affected by
discrimination, including women, Native Americans, Asian
Americans, Hispanics, institutionalized persons and handi-
capped persons, have increasingly asserted civil rights demands.
Broadened Division activity reflects this contemporary reality.
In addition to the Civil Rights Division of the Department
of Justice, there are a number of other federal agencies involved
in civil rights areas. They include: the Equal Employment Op-
portunities Commission, the Office for Civil Rights in the De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Office of Fed-
eral Contract Compliance in the Department of Labor, the Civil
Rights Commission, and a number of civil rights offices in other
BARKER & T. BARKER, JR., CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION, CASES AND COMMENTA-
RIES, 396, 414-15 (4th ed. 1982); J. BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES, 323-26 (1981).
40. Id.
41. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1975).
1983]
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
agencies charged with more limited responsibilities.
Worthy of special notice is the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission, commonly known as EEOC. It is a powerful
independent government unit with primary responsibility in the
area of the elimination of employment discrimination.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was cre-
ated by the famous Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42
an Act described as "[t]he single most far reaching law ever en-
acted by the Federal Government to eliminate employment dis-
crimination. ' '48 The Act, which EEOC is to enforce, prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin by employers, employment agencies, and labor or-
ganizations. As currently amended, the Act applies to the full
range of employer-employee relations, including recruitment,
hiring, promotion, discharge, classification, training, and com-
pensation. Employers covered include private businesses-as well
as most federal, state, and local government employers.
The basic enforcement procedure of the EEOC is as follows:
first, individual complainants file claims with the Commission at
local offices." Next, the EEOC proceeds with its own investiga-
tion for which it has the power to subpoena witnesses and docu-
ments. If the Commission discovers indications that there has
been a violation of Title VII, a charge may be filed in federal
district court against the alleged offender and, further, tempo-
rary relief sought for the victim of the alleged discrimination.
The above process, however, is subject to two caveats. In juris-
dictions in which an enforceable fair employment practices law
exists, the case must be deferred to the local rights enforcement
agency for sixty days. The Commission is also responsible for
efforts at conciliation between the parties. The court, upon a
finding that the employer has violated Title VII, may impose
such remedies as "hiring, reinstatement, promotion, awards of
back pay, retroactive seniority, and any other equitable relief
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-15 (1976).
43. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PROMISES AND PERCEPTIONS, FEDERAL EFFORTS
TO ELIMINATE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION THROUGH AFFIRMATIVE ACTION. A REPORT OF
THIRTEEN STATE ADVISORY COMMITTEES TO THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 17
(1981).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 706e (1976). If the EEOC is unable to secure voluntary compli-
ance within 30 days, it notifies complainant and complainant may bring a civil action
against the employer. Id.
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the court deems appropriate. 4 5
Turning to non-governmental human rights organizations,
their importance in performing the function of invocation can-
not be overemphasized. They either take the initiative for, or
assist, litigation in defense of the rights of the individual. Al-
though there are many non-governmental organizations, they
differ significantly in membership, goals, areas of activity, re-
sources, strategies, and effectiveness. Some address a single
topic, region, or group of persons, while others focus on a wider
range of issues and concerns.
In terms of emphasis on court litigation as a fundamental
strategy of operation, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund (Legal Defense Fund) is a major organization.
The Legal Defense Fund was founded in 1939 by the Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP), an organization closely identified with the effort to
enhance protections for blacks in the United States. The organi-
zations have operated under separate boards of directors since
1957 and have come to perform different roles in the human
rights movement.46 The NAACP has remained our nation's larg-
est civil rights membership organization. The Legal Defense
Fund has focused on civil rights litigation. Legal Defense Fund's
first Director-Counsel was Thurgood Marshall, who later became
Solicitor General of the United States, and is now an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court.
After its victory in 1954 in the landmark case -of Brown v.
Board of Education, which outlawed segregation in public
schools, the Fund has maintained an active program of litigation
to make that decision effective. 47 The Legal Defense Fund law-
yers have handled a host of important cases decided by the
United States Supreme Court in the area of school desegrega-
45. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PROMISES AND PERCEPTIONS, FEDERAL EFFORTS
TO ELIMINATE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION THROUGH AFFIRMATIVE ACTION. A REPORT OF
THIRTEEN STATE ADVISORY COMMITTEES TO THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 20
(1981). See also id. 19-20 for a description of the EEOC enforcement process.
46. Recently, the two organizations have engaged in litigation over the right to use
the initials N.A.A.C.P. See N.A.A.C.P. v. N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense & Education Fund,
Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1337 (D.C. 1982). See also N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense & Education
Fund, Inc., Memorandum To Colleagues in the Civil Rights Movement (May 29, 1982).




tion, involving such issues as transfer of pupils, faculty desegre-
gation, school boards' affirmative responsibility to integrate
schools, and busing as a remedial device in school desegregation
plans. They represented the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in
the settlement following the historic Montgomery March.48 In
recent years the Fund has made important contributions toward
outlawing capital punishment through court battles.
Another organization of great importance is the American
Civil Liberties Union, commonly known as the ACLU. Founded
in 1920, the American Civil Liberties Union is a membership or-
ganization with over 200,000 members nationwide. The organiza-
tion has a rich history of litigation for the extension of human
rights, particularly in the area of the first amendment, including
the freedom of expression and freedom of religion. It was as an
ACLU volunteer lawyer that Clarence Darrow represented a
public school teacher who violated a Tennessee state statute for-
bidding the teaching of scientific doctrines of evolution in public
schools. This was the famous case of the Scopes trial.49
ACLU volunteer lawyers have participated in a variety of
landmark court decisions in the first amendment area. As a
staunch defender of constitutional rights, the ACLU is known
for its courage and willingness to fight for the rights of unpopu-
lar social and political groups. For instance, the ACLU not too
long ago was involved in the Skokie cases in defense of the free-
dom of speech and assembly of the National Socialist Party of
America, popularly known as the American Nazi Party, when
the Party was forbidden by the Village of Skokie in Illinois from
activities of assembly and demonstration."' Skokie has a large
population of persons who were victims of the Holocaust. The
involvement of the ACLU was bitterly attacked and many of its
supporters withdrew financial and other support. But the ACLU
was emphatic in stating that while it disagreed most strongly
with the objectives and ideals espoused by the American Nazi
48. Branton, The Effect of Brown v. Board of Education, 23 How. L.J. 131, 132
(1980).
49. Ennis, A.C.L.U.: 60 Years of Volunteer Lawyering, 66 A.B.A.J. 1080 (September
1980). See also Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1925).
50. See Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1275-78 (1980); Cohen, Right To Be Offensive: Sko-
kie-the Extreme Test: National Socialist Party, 226 NATION 422-28 (1978).
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Party, it strongly defended the freedom of speech and assembly
of the American Nazi Party. The ACLU takes its cases with the
conviction that "Constitutional principles are tested most when
the persons asserting them are most despised."'"
In 1963, when racial violence in the Southern states focused
public attention on the issue of racial discrimination, President
John F. Kennedy called upon leading lawyers to aid the struggle
for black citizens' equal rights. The Lawyers' Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law was formed by prominent members of
the legal community in response to the President's appeal. Law-
yers' Committee attorneys have fought for enforcement of voting
guarantees for blacks under the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
against the granting of federal tax exemptions to private segre-
gated schools, and for strengthening protections for those who
organize and support civil rights boycotts and protests.2
In employing the strategy of litigation, these groups have
relied especially on the development of individual test cases with
a personal victim as a party in each litigation, and on the class
action in which one or more individuals sue on behalf of a group
having similar claims. Another notable strategy is participation
in a particular litigation in the form of "amicus curiae," "friend
of the court." A friend of the court is a person who, permitted to
appear in a lawsuit, provides information to the court on a point
of law about which the court is doubtful. An amicus curiae is
not a party to the lawsuit, and must not have a personal stake in
the outcome of the case. Granting appearance as a friend of the
court is within the discretion of the court. 3
Although the amicus curiae is generally an attorney, others,
such as ordinary citizens, boards of education, and labor unions,
have been allowed to appear. The appearance may take the form
of an oral statement in open court, an affidavit, or a brief. It is
within the discretion of the court whether or not to accept the
views or suggestions of the amicus curiae, and the amicus curiae
has no legal recourse if the court refuses to accept his views.
51. Ennis, note 49 supra, at 1083.
52. Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law: It has been twenty years . ..
(pamphlet printed in 1983 describing activities of Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
during the past twenty years).
53. See generally Barker, Third Parties in Litigation: A Systemic View of the Judi-
cial Function, 29 JOURNAL OF POLITICS 41 (1967).
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The rules of the United States Supreme Court have enabled
individuals, organizations, and government attorneys to file
briefs and/or make oral argument in the Supreme Court. For ex-
ample, in University of California Regents v. Bakke,"4 more
than 110 organizations and individuals filed amicus curiae briefs
before the Court.6 The Bakke case involved the constitutional-
ity of a special admissions program for minority applicants to
the Medical School of the University of California at Davis.
Thus, the frequent involvement of human rights organizations in
Supreme Court cases in the form of amicus curiae has often
given litigation "the distinct flavor of group combat.' 5 a Indeed,
the participation of human rights organizations as amici curiae
has become a most remarkable form of group representation in
Supreme Court cases.
Another organization I would like to mention is the Law-
yers' Committee for International Human Rights, based in New
York. Among its many tasks is the use of the domestic judicial
process in the United States to promote international human
rights. It has been most active in refugee and asylum cases, espe-
cially problems involving thousands of refugees from Haiti.
When the Haitian refugees were subject to mass detention in the
United States in 1981, the Committee brought a class action
lawsuit on behalf of a nationwide class of Haitians in detention.
Thanks largely to their efforts, United States District Court
Judge Eugene P. Spellman, in June 1982, ordered the class of
almost 2,000 Haitians released from detention on the grounds
that the government, in undertaking its detention program, had
failed to comply with the requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act.5 7 All of the detained Haitians have now been re-
54. University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
55. W. MURPHY & C. PRITCHETT, COURTS, JUDGES AND POLITICS, 395 (1979).
56. Vose, Litigation as a Form of Pressure Group Politics, 319 ANNALS OF THE AMER-
ICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 20 (1958).
57. Louise v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 1004 (S.D. Fla. 1982). The central question
raised by this action was whether an excludable citizen may be incarcerated and denied
parole during pendency and on appeal of his claim for admission to this country. The
court held that nonresident aliens are entitled to the same constitutional protections
afforded all persons within the territorial jursidiction of the United States; that they may
not be deprived of their liberty without due process, nor denied parole solely because of
their race or national origin. The Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) policy
of detaining Haitians until those aliens established, to the satisfaction of the Service, a
prima facie claim for admission, was held to violate the Administrative Procedure Act in
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leased and provisionally placed in various localities around the
country, pending a final determination of their individual claims
for political asylum. Consequently, the Lawyers' Committee has
waged a nationwide campaign to recruit and train volunteer law-
yers to represent the released Haitians in their individual appli-
cations for asylum."
What is especially significant is that the Lawyers' Commit-
tee has invoked both transnational and national human rights
prescriptions relating to the protection of refugees in the course
of litigation. This emphasis on the interplay of national and
transnational human rights laws symbolizes a new direction in
human rights litigation within the United States. This emphasis
has been greatly inspired by the famous decision of Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala59 by Judge Kaufman of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. In the Filartiga case, Judge
Kaufman applied international human rights law to establish
that freedom from torture is protected under customary interna-
tional law, which forms a part of the law of the land in the
United States. Therefore, the alleged act of torture committed
in Paraguay by a local police chief against a Paraguay national
became an actionable tort before United States courts under the
Alien Torts Claim Act.60 The death victim's father and sister
that the INS had failed to give the affected parties required notice and opportunity to
comment on the policy before adoption and had failed thereafter to publish the policy in
the Federal Register thirty days before its scheduled implementation. Therefore, the
court found the detention policy in question to be null and void. The incarcerated Hai-
tian nationals were held to be entitled to release on parole pending a determination of
their claims for admission.
In a later ruling, however, Judge Spellman held that those Haitians who had es-
caped from detention prior to the above decision were not eligible for parole pursuant to
the court's determination. Louise v. Nelson, 560 F. Supp. 899 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
58. THE LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, SUMMARY OF THE
HAITIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM IN THE U.S. AND THE RESPONSE OF THE LAWYERS' COMMITTEE
FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 4-5 (1982).
59. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976). The statute requires that the plaintiff allege a "violation
of the law of nations" in order to pass the jurisdictional threshold. In Filartiga, see
supra note 59, the court held that "[i]t is only where the nations of the world have
demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of
express international accords, that a wrong generally recognized becomes an interna-
tional law violation within the meaning of the statute." Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 888. The
court concluded that through international accords and unilateral action, the nations of
the world have made it clear that domestic human rights violations are prohibited by
international law. Id. at 889.
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who lived in New York brought the lawsuit against Pena when
he was held in custody pending deportation for illegal overstay
in the United States. The litigation was assisted by the Center
for Constitutional Rights, another non-governmental human
rights organization.
Finally, it may be noted that in the United States an indi-
vidual victim who is claiming a deprivation need not enlist the
aid of an organization or agency-he can bring his own claim
before the court. Often, he is assisted by a lawyer, who is, quite
often, an advocate of constitutional rights. But this is not a re-
quirement. Given a wide range of important roles played by the
lawyer in the United States, the legal profession is in a sense a
professional corps of ombudsmen. As de Tocqueville aptly ob-
served a long time ago, in the United States, important political
and social issues are sooner or later transformed into legal issues
for judicial litigation and adjudication."'
Turning now to application. The application of prescrip-
tions in particular instances is, of course, of crucial importance
to human rights. This is the ultimate outcome sought in all
human rights policies. As important as it is to challenge unlaw-
ful deprivations, it is equally urgent to secure applications that
both put basic community policies into controlling practice and
mobilize a continuing consensus, in support of prescription, to-
ward the greater future protection and fulfillment of human
rights.62
Of the utmost importance in this regard is the role of the
Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court has
become the ultimate guardian of the freedoms and rights of the
individual in the United States. Vital to this role is the power of
judicial review, a power that can be exercised, in deciding cases
and controversies properly brought before the Court, to review
relevant laws, regulations, or acts involved, federal or state, and
declare invalid any act that is repugnant to the Constitution.
This power, first established in the famous case of Marbury
v. Madison 8 in 1803, has made the Supreme Court the ultimate
61. A. DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 99-105 (G. Lawrence trans., J. Mayer
ed. 1969).
62. M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL, & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC OR-
DER 289-92 (1980).
63. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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arbiter of the meaning of our laws in defense of the Constitution
as the supreme law of the land.
Because of this power of judicial review, the bulk of the bus-
iness of the United States Supreme Court has come to consist of
scrutinizing the action of government officials, such as the po-
lice, the regulatory agencies, and at times even Congress itself.
In effect, in our country, the Supreme Court is the most highly
specialized institution for the protection of human rights. In the
words of a commentator:
The Supreme Court of the United States is different
from all other courts, past and present. It decides funda-
mental social and political questions that would never be
put to judges in other countries-the boundaries between
church and state, the relations between the white and
Negro races, the powers of the national legislature and
the executive. One could easily forget that it is a court at
all. Its public image seems sometimes to be less that of a
court than of an extraordinarily powerful demigod sitting
on a remote throne and letting loose constitutional thun-
derbolts whenever it sees a wrong crying for correction.
But the Supreme Court is not a demigod, nor even a
roving inspector general with a conscience. It is a court,
and for all its power it must operate in significant re-
spects as courts have always operated. It cannot, like a
legislature or governor or President, initiate measures to
cure the ills it perceives. It is . . . a substantially passive
instrument to be moved only by the initiative of litigants.
In short, the Court must sit and wait for issues to be
presented to it in lawsuits."
Aside from the constitutional requirement of deciding only
cases and controversies rather than rendering advisory opin-
ions," the Supreme Court has exhibited considerable caution
64. A. LEWis, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 11-12 (1964).
65. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. In 1793, the Supreme Court stated its refusal to render
advisory opinions in these terms:
[The] three departments of the government (being) in certain respects checks
upon each other, and our being judges of a court in the last resort, are considera-
tions which afford strong arguments against the propriety of our extrajudicially
deciding the questions alluded to, especially as the power given by the Constitu-
tion to the President, of calling on the heads of departments for opinions, seems
19831
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dictated by prudential considerations relating to institutional in-
tegrity, effectiveness, and limitations. In addition to its discre-
tion in granting or denying certiorari, the Court has developed a
host of doctrines and techniques relating to standing,"8 ripe-
ness,6 7 mootness,68 and political question 9 to minimize prema-
ture, unnecessary intervention in matters regarded as "hot pota-
to have been purposely as well as expressly united to the executive departments.
Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to President Washington (August 8,
1793), reprinted in G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1607-08
(10th ed. 1980) (emphasis in original).
66. The stahding doctrine was described by Chief Justice Warren as being a question
of
whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an
adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable
... the emphasis... is on whether the party invoking federal court jurisdiction
'has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' and whether the dispute
touches upon 'legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.'
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-101 (1968). See also Valley Forge College v. Americans
United, 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), Schlesinger v. Reservists
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974). See generally Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Liti-
gation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982); Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence
of Article III; Perspectives on the 'Case or Controversy' Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV.
297 (1979); Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J.
1363 (1973).
67. The ripeness doctrine acts to deter litigation which is brought prior to the exis-
tence of a fully-developed case or controversy worthy of judicial review. See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 127-29 (1973); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967);
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
68. The mootness doctrine requires that a genuine controversy exist between the par-
ties from the time the complaint is filed through final disposition by the Supreme Court
in order to be properly justiciable. As such, it is the analytical counterpart of the ripe-
ness doctrine. A familiar case applying the mootness doctrine is DeFunis v. Odegaard,
416 U.S. 312 (1974). But see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), where the Court relaxed
the mootness bar on the basis that "the normal 266-day human gestation period is so
short that the pregnancy will come to term before the unsual appellate process is com-
plete." Id. at 125. The "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception is contained
in Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498 (1911). See also Note, The Moot-
ness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REV. 373 (1974).
69. The political question doctrine holds that certain questions are non-justiciable
because of their political nature. Various bases are suggested for a determination that a
non-justiciable political question exists: that the issue is constitutionally committed to
another branch of government; that treatment of the issue would involve matters for
which no judicially manageable standards exist; that prudential considerations, institu-
tional propriety or efficiency, dictate referral of the issue to another branch of govern-
ment. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See
also Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976)
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toes." But the Court does not shirk its responsibility, when it is
convinced of its duty to act.
For instance, reapportionment cases having to do with the
line-drawing of electoral districts had for a long time been re-
garded by the Court as "non-justiciable"-that is, beyond the
domain of its adjudicative competence. 70 But when such a
hands-off policy appeared to have played into the hands of self-
serving political manipulators to the detriment of citizens' equal
and effective participation in the political process, the Court
stepped in to defend the basic policy that the franchise,.as exer-
cised by each citizen, must be of approximately equal weight.
The Court brushed aside arguments based on the doctrine of po-
litical question by refining that doctrine and pronounced the
principle of "one person, one vote" to govern reapportionment
cases.
7 1
A similar response was manifested in the area of school de-
segregation. After the monumental decision of Brown v. Board
of Education72 outlawing segregation in public schools, the
Court allowed local communities a transitional period to take
good faith measures to carry out "at all deliberate speed 7' the
mandate of the decision. When it appeared that there had been
all deliberate measures of evasion and escape but no speed in
desegregation, the Court emphatically intervened by formulating
basic guidelines for school desegregation and supervising their
implementation by local communities concerned. The traditional
argument of political question did not prevail.74
It is quite remarkable that the United States Supreme
Court, viewed as a whole, has been highly flexible and responsive
to the challenges of changing times under ever changing environ-
ments. It has on the whole acted on the wisdom of Chief Justice
John Marshall that "it is a constitution we are expounding"7 5
70. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
71. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
72. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
73. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II provided for
implementation of the decision in the first Brown case).
74. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ.
v. Brinkman (Dayton II), 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974);
Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
75. 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
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and has given vitality and meaning to constitutional provisions
framed in a high level of generality. Hence, while the text of
constitutional provisions remains unchanged for two hundred
years, the living constitution in action is constantly evolving in
response to the changing needs and demands of the people. In
constant growth, it has responded to unfolding crises that could
not be foreseen by the Framers. The Court has tended to take a
contextual, rather than textualist, approach in interpreting and
applying general constitutional provisions to concrete cases.
From the early era of the predominant concern for national
unity and nation-building, the Court has moved to the new ep-
och of human rights in a world of growing interdependence.
Whereas the first eight amendments to the Constitution
were once regarded as applicable only to acts of the federal gov-
ernment, they have been made applicable to state action
through the ingenious technique of selective incorporation.76
The standards of protection available at the federal level have
thus been made equally applicable to state and local levels. This
enhanced protection of the individual through the nationaliza-
tion of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights has been further for-
tified by the broadened concept of state action."
76. As originally enacted, the Bill of Rights protected individuals and the states from
actions of the federal government but was not a limitation on the actions of the states.
See Barron v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (1833). Since the
adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the extent to which that amendment incorpo-
rates the protections of the Bill of Rights, that is, the extent to which it safeguards the
fundamental rights and liberties enunciated in the first eight amendments against action
of the states, has been a continuing source of dispute. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). Some have argued that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights in toto, but
this view has been rejected consistently by the Court. See Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Instead, the Court has held that the limitations
contained in the Bill of Rights constrain the states only on a selective basis. The due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment is held to incorporate the Bill of Rights only
so far as the protections and rights in question are essential to fundamental principles of
ordered liberty. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). Nevertheless, the case by
case consideration of the incorporation issue has resulted in a gradual accretion of incor-
porated rights. Today, most of the rights recognized to exist under the Bill of Rights
have been deemed sufficiently fundamental to merit incorporation in the fourteenth
amendment, gaining thereby protection against action by the states.
77. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement of restrictive
covenants sufficient basis for finding state action). See also Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 164 (1972) (licensing by state liquor authority not state action for pur-
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Thanks to the equality revolution begun by the Warren
Court, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
has become the major vehicle in extending equal protection to
all members of the community-to blacks, to women, to aliens,
to non-marital children, to handicapped persons, to the elderly,
and so on. The fourteenth amendment provides in part that no
state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the law." These few words have been given real life
meaning in many volumes of the Supreme Court Reports. In un-
equivocal terms, the Court has outlawed invidious group dif-
ferentiations irrelevant to a person's capabilities and contribu-
tions. Recently, the Court even invalidated a Texas statute
permitting local school boards to deny free education to school-
aged children of illegal aliens as violative of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 78
The really difficult issues in the area of equal protection to-
day relate to what is known as the affirmative action program, or
as some people call it, "reverse discrimination." The issue was
highlighted by the case of University of California Regents v.
Bakke,79 in which the Court struck down the quota reserved for
minority applicants for admission to the Medical School of the
University of California at Davis. But the Court also took the
occasion to emphasize that race can be taken into account in
devising programs to achieve genuine equality by remedying the
effects of past discrimination. That remedial, temporary mea-
sures designed to achieve genuine equality, devoid of stigma-
tizing intent, are permissible has gained further support in the
later cases of United Steelworkers of America v. Weber 0 and
Fullilove v. Klutznick.8' Because of the far-reaching ramifica-
tions of affirmative action programs of all kinds, debate goes on
as to whether our Constitution is "color blind" or "color con-
scious"-the real answer is "genuine equality" that serves the
poses of a finding of unconstitutional racial discrimination by a private club); Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (state action present where restau-
rant within a public parking facility refused to serve Black customers). See generally,
Henkin, Shelley v. Kramer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1962).
78. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
79. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See generally N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETH-
NIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY (1975).
80. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).




Another component of the fourteenth amendment is the due
process clause which stipulates that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
The term "liberty" is critical. In what is known as the Lochner"2
era in the early twentieth century, the Court gave excessive im-
portance to the "liberty of contract" under the laissez-faire phi-
losophy, with emphasis on freedom of choice in regard to the
wealth value. With the coming of the New Deal, the Lochner
approach was discredited. 3 Most recently, there has been a revi-
val of "substantive due process." The Court was able to estab-
lish a constitutional right of privacy in the famous case of Gris-
wold v. Connecticut84 decided in 1965. In this case, the
Connecticut law forbidding the use of contraceptives, as applied
to a married couple, was declared unconstitutional for having vi-
olated the right of privacy of the couple involved. In our Consti-
tution, there is no explicit provision for a right of privacy. But,
the Court was able to establish this right by developing a
penumbra theory based on most of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights, including the ninth amendment, or alternatively, based
on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
right of privacy thus established in the context of marital rela-
tions has been further extended to the non-marital context of
intimate personal relations.5 As case law evolves, it appears that
"privacy" has both restrictive and broad references. In its re-
strictive sense, it means informational privacy, control of infor-
mation about oneself. In its broad reference, it is emerging as a
functional equivalent of "the right to be let alone,"" personal
autonomy, freedom of choice. This personal autonomy is said to
include at least a pregnant woman's power to control over her
82. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
83. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). See also West Coast Hotel Co. v. Par-
rish, 300 U.S. 370 (1937).
84. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
85. See, e.g., Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See generally
Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1974); Kalvin [sic], 'Privacy
and Freedom'-A Review, 23 REc. N.Y.C.B.A. 185, 187 (1968).
86. 1 COOLEY, TORTS 34 (4th ed. 1932). See generally Brandeis & Warren, The Right
to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) (discusses the derivation of the right to be let
alone from common law principles); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960) (dis-
cusses the four distinct kinds of invasion which comprise the law of privacy).
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own body. Hence, the controversial decision of Roe v. Wade87 in
1973, recognizing the right to abortion as a component of the
right of privacy. The scope and contours of the right of privacy
are still evolving as further litigation unfolds.
In sum, the flexible, contextual approach of the Court has
resulted in more human rights protection for more people in
more areas, extending to all important value sectors.
I turn now to termination. Termination means putting an
end to an existing prescription."8 Since the constitutional pre-
scriptions for the protection of human rights of the individual
are so intensely demanded and so highly cherished, modification
or termination of such prescriptions has been made extremely
difficult.
Article V of our Constitution provides the formal proce-
dures for amending the Constitution. In general, a proposed
amendment to the Constitution must first be adopted by a two-
thirds vote of both Houses of Congress, and then "ratified by the
Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States." Article V
also provides another amending procedure in the special conven-
tion method, but this procedure has never been invoked. Al-
though two-thirds votes by both Houses may not be too difficult
to obtain, securing ratification by the Legislatures of three-
fourths of all the fifty states, requiring a minimum of thirty-
eight state ratifications, appears to be a formidable barrier.
This explains in part why there have been only twenty-six
amendments to the Constitution in the nearly 200-year history
of the document.89 The most recent example is of course the de-
feat of the Equal Rights Amendment (commonly known as
ERA) that seeks to ensure that "[e]quality of rights under the
law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any State on account of sex." This defeat came after the very
long, intense efforts of promotion by women's groups and many
87. 410 U.S. 133 (1973).
88. See McDougal & Reisman, The Prescribing Function in World Constitutive Pro-
cess: How International Law Is Made, 6 YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 249
(1980).
89. A proposed amendment to the Constitution to treat the District of Columbia as a
state for purposes of representation in Congress, Presidential elections, and Article V of
the Constitution was passed by Congress in 1978. It must be approved by three-fourths
of the states by August 22, 1985 if it is to become effective. At present, only twelve states
have approved the amendment. See 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS F1 (April 1983).
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other groups.0 It is important to note, however, that this defeat
does not mean women are not given equal protection in the
United States. Quite to the contrary. Women in the United
States do enjoy equal protection. What it means is simply that
instead of relying upon a new constitutional amendment
designed exclusively to ban sex-based discrimination, the equal-
ity for sexes will continue to be secured under the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment through judicial
processes, and through statutory enactments and implementa-
tion, both federal and state."e
Because of the tremendous difficulties involved in the for-
mal amendment procedure, not infrequently attempts are made,
through the legislative device, to modify or dilute the human
rights protection expounded in Supreme Court decisions. Su-
preme Court decisions, as may be recalled, contribute greatly to
the growth of the living Constitution in the United States, and
enjoy high authority. Given the Court's ultimate authority in
constitutional interpretation, the human rights protection ex-
tended by Supreme Court decisions, in principle, cannot be
taken away or diluted through a congressional statute.'2
Nevertheless, attempts at such modification or termination
have not been lacking. Recently, for instance, several such pro-
posals have been introduced before the Congress for enactment.
What have come to be known as "right to life" bills are intro-
duced before the Congress in an attempt to take away or dilute
the woman's right to control her body, i.e., the right to abortion,
a right encompassed by the right of privacy supported largely by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, as enunci-
ated in Roe v. Wade. In that decision, the Court pronounced a
90. The Equal Rights Amendment has been reintroduced. See S.J. RES. 10, 98th
CONG., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R.J. Res. 1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
91. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). For a discussion of constitutional doctrine
concerning sex discrimination, see generally J. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
121-26 (1983).
92. In McCulloch v. Maryland, the Supreme Court stated:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adopted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.
17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819). See also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 n.10 (1966). See
generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 261-72 (1978).
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trimester formula: (1) During the first trimester of pregnancy,
the woman and her physician have the right to terminate the
pregnancy, with the method of their own choice. (2) During the
second trimester, the state can prescribe regulations governing
the abortion procedure, such as qualifications for persons com-
petent to perform abortions, and requirements that abortions be
performed in a hospital or clinic. The community interest in
protecting the health of the mother is considered compelling. (3)
During the third trimester, after the fetus becomes viable, i.e.,
capable of sustaining life outside the mother (approximately at
the end of the sixth month of pregnancy), the state can regulate
or even bar abortions altogether unless they are necessary to
save the life of the mother. At this stage, the state's compelling
interest is, obviously, the protection of potential life. 3
Ever since this decision was rendered in 1973, the decision
itself, while authoritative, has been highly controversial. It has
generated very intense emotions and bitter debate, pitting anti-
abortion groups ("pro-life" groups) against pro-abortion groups.
These bills, controversial as they are, have met strong opposition
in Congress, which questions the constitutionality and wisdom
of these proposals. The appropriate course to effect change, it is
widely agreed, is through a constitutional amendment, not a leg-
islative enactment.'4 But, as indicated, the path of formal consti-
tutional amendment is full of formidable barriers.
However, the path of formal constitutional amendment has
recently been initiated with regard to prayer and other religious
activity in public schools. The first amendment of our Constitu-
tion contains the following provision:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
In defense of the paramount policy of the separation of church
and state inherent in this provision, the Supreme Court of the
United States, in 1962, held that it was unconstitutional for
93. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
94. See S.J. Res. 3, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (proposal by Sen. Hatch). See also
S.J. Res. 4, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (proposal by Sen. Baker); S.J. Res. 8, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1983) (proposal by Sen. Helms); H.R.J. Res. 15, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. (1983)
(proposal by Rep. Emerson); H.R.J. Res. 26, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (proposal by
Rep. Hansen); H.R.J. Res. 73, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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state officials to compose a prayer and require its recitation each
school day, even though the prayer was non-denominational in
content and students who did not wish to participate would be
excused." In the following year the Court again held it unconsti-
tutional to require a reading from the Bible or a recitation of the
Lord's Prayer."' These and other related decisions have caused
considerable uproar. After successive attempts at modification
through the legislative route failed, a serious effort through a
constitutional amendment has been under way. Recently, a pro-
posed amendment to the Constitution has been introduced
before the Congress, a proposal that has the support of Presi-
dent Reagan. The proposed amendment reads as follows:
Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to pro-
hibit prayer or other religious activity in public schools.
Neither the United States nor any State shall require any
person to participate in prayer or other religious activity,
or influence the form or content of any prayer or other
religious activity in such public schools."
These efforts in seeking termination or modification of ex-
isting constitutional prescriptions embodied in Supreme Court
decisions, difficult as they are, also illustrate that the ongoing
process of constitutional decision never really ceases. While Su-
preme Court decisions enjoy ultimate authority, they are not, in
a profound and dynamic sense, really final and immutable. The
Court decisions are constantly subject to critical appraisal and
reappraisal, especially by the legal community and the press.
The practical effect of a decision goes beyond the parties di-
95. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). The prayer read: "Almighty God, we ac-
knowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents,
our teachers, and our Country." Id. at 422.
96. Abington School District v. Schnepp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
97. H.R.J. Res. 133, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The Senate has formulated a similar
proposal which states: "Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to prohibit indi-
vidual or group prayer in public schools or other public institutions. No person shall be
required by the United States to participate in prayer." S.J. Res. 73, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983).
See also S. Res. 88, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (proposal by Sen. Tepsen); S. Res.
784 & 785, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (proposal by Sen. Helms); H.R. Res. 183, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (proposal by Rep. Holt); H.R. Con. Res. 5, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983) (proposal by Rep. Holt); H.R. Con. Res. 13, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (proposal
by Rep. Neal).
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rectly involved in a particular constitutional litigation, often
generating expectations in members of the community at large.
Decisions which lack overwhelming stable support of the people
are apt to be challenged, and, in the long run, are bound to be
changed.
In an open, democratic, pluralistic society, such an apprais-
ing function is vital. It is a function designed to evaluate the
process of decision in terms of the policy objectives of the larger
community and to identify the participants responsible for past
successes and failures. This function is open to non-officials as
well as officials. For instance, a large part of the work of the
United States Commission on Civil Rights, an independent gov-
ernmental agency concerned with civil rights matters, has to do
with this function." And, of course, the important roles played
by scholars, practitioners, commentators, and opinion makers in
this regard cannot be overemphasized.
In performing critical appraisal, it is absolutely essential
that a flow of dependable, relevant information is available. This
points to the importance of the informational function-the
function of gathering, processing, and disseminating information
relevant to value deprivations and fulfillments and to decision-
making. This function is open to officials and non-officials. The
press, in command of the modern media of mass communication,
is especially important in exposing and publicizing facts of viola-
tions of human rights and in mobilizing public opinion in sup-
port of the defense and fulfillment of human rights. Hence the
indispensability of a free and independent press, and the very
special protection under the first amendment afforded to the
press in the United States.
The freedom of expression is enjoyed not only by the press,
but is extended to every person within the United States. This
generic freedom, including the freedom of association, assembly,
and petition, is enjoyed and highly cherished by everyone, acting
both as an individual and as a member of a group. Because of
this freedom it has been possible for people to join together to
form and maintain all kinds of organizations-civic groups, in-
98. For a discussion of recent developments in the work of the Commission, see
Plotkin, Prologue to the Report by the Washington Council of Lawyers, 1 N.Y.L. SCH.
HUM. RTS. ANN. 99 (1983).
19831
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
terest groups, and pressure groups of all kinds-for all kinds of
human rights causes. The workings of these groups have contrib-
uted immensely to the promotion of the cause of human rights
through advocacy and agitation for new legislation or other
action.
It is people and government working together, both the pri-
vate and public sectors working hand in hand, in performing all
the distinctive and related decision functions-information, pro-
motion, prescription, invocation, application, termination, and
appraisal-that have made the protection of human rights a liv-
ing reality in the United States, despite all the shortcomings we
have had and continue to have.
In an open, democratic society like the United States, the
protection of human rights is not just the business of judges and
other governmental officials. It is everyone's business. It is too
important a business to leave it just to the government, or any
single governmental agency. Human rights can flourish, only
when every member and every sector of the community are vigi-
lant in defending and protecting them. The achievement of
human dignity requires eternal vigilance.
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